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Code Editor : usr.bin.man
# vim:syntax=apparmor #include <tunables/global> /usr/bin/man { #include <abstractions/base> # Use a special profile when man calls anything groff-related. We only # include the programs that actually parse input data in a non-trivial # way, not wrappers such as groff and nroff, since the latter would need a # broader profile. /usr/bin/eqn rmCx -> &man_groff, /usr/bin/grap rmCx -> &man_groff, /usr/bin/pic rmCx -> &man_groff, /usr/bin/preconv rmCx -> &man_groff, /usr/bin/refer rmCx -> &man_groff, /usr/bin/tbl rmCx -> &man_groff, /usr/bin/troff rmCx -> &man_groff, /usr/bin/vgrind rmCx -> &man_groff, # Similarly, use a special profile when man calls decompressors and other # simple filters. /{,usr/}bin/bzip2 rmCx -> &man_filter, /{,usr/}bin/gzip rmCx -> &man_filter, /usr/bin/col rmCx -> &man_filter, /usr/bin/compress rmCx -> &man_filter, /usr/bin/iconv rmCx -> &man_filter, /usr/bin/lzip.lzip rmCx -> &man_filter, /usr/bin/tr rmCx -> &man_filter, /usr/bin/xz rmCx -> &man_filter, # Allow basically anything in terms of file system access, subject to DAC. # The purpose of this profile isn't to confine man itself (that might be # nice in the future, but is tricky since it's quite configurable), but to # confine the processes it calls that parse untrusted data. /** mrixwlk, unix, capability setuid, capability setgid, signal peer=@{profile_name}, signal peer=/usr/bin/man//&man_groff, signal peer=/usr/bin/man//&man_filter, # Site-specific additions and overrides. See local/README for details. #include <local/usr.bin.man> } profile man_groff { #include <abstractions/base> # Recent kernels revalidate open FDs, and there are often some still # open on TTYs. This is temporary until man learns to close irrelevant # open FDs before execve. #include <abstractions/consoles> # man always runs its groff pipeline with the input file open on stdin, # so we can skip <abstractions/user-manpages>. /usr/bin/eqn rm, /usr/bin/grap rm, /usr/bin/pic rm, /usr/bin/preconv rm, /usr/bin/refer rm, /usr/bin/tbl rm, /usr/bin/troff rm, /usr/bin/vgrind rm, /etc/groff/** r, /usr/lib/groff/site-tmac/** r, /usr/share/groff/** r, signal peer=/usr/bin/man, # @{profile_name} doesn't seem to work here. signal peer=/usr/bin/man//&man_groff, } profile man_filter { #include <abstractions/base> # Recent kernels revalidate open FDs, and there are often some still # open on TTYs. This is temporary until man learns to close irrelevant # open FDs before execve. #include <abstractions/consoles> /{,usr/}bin/bzip2 rm, /{,usr/}bin/gzip rm, /usr/bin/col rm, /usr/bin/compress rm, /usr/bin/iconv rm, /usr/bin/lzip.lzip rm, /usr/bin/tr rm, /usr/bin/xz rm, # Manual pages can be more or less anywhere, especially with "man -l", and # there's no harm in allowing wide read access here since the worst it can # do is feed data to the invoking man process. /** r, # Allow writing cat pages. /var/cache/man/** w, signal peer=/usr/bin/man, # @{profile_name} doesn't seem to work here. signal peer=/usr/bin/man//&man_filter, }
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